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 This cause is before the Court upon Defendant Twitter, Inc.’s (“Twitter”) 
motion to transfer to the Northern District of California. (Mot., ECF No. 41.) 
Twitter requests that the Court transfer this action to the Northern District of 
California pursuant to a forum selection clause in Twitter’s Terms of Service. 
(See generally, Mot., ECF No. 41.) Plaintiffs Donald J. Trump, Linda Cuadros, 
American Conservative Union, Rafael Barboza, Dominick Latella, Wayne Allen 
Root, and Naomi Wolf oppose the motion. (Resp. in Opp’n, ECF No. 58.) Twitter 
filed a reply (ECF No. 65), and the Plaintiffs were afforded leave to file a 
surreply. (ECF No. 75.) After careful review of the parties’ arguments, the 
record, and relevant legal authorities, the Court grants Twitter’s Motion. (ECF 
No. 41.)  
1. Background  
 This action arises from various actions taken by Twitter affecting the 
Plaintiffs’ use of their Twitter accounts.  
 Twitter is a corporation with its principal place of business in San 
Francisco, California. (Am. Compl., ECF No. 21 at ¶ 25.) Twitter operates an 
internet communications platform that allows millions of users to share their 
opinions and follow current events. (Id. at ¶ 2.) Twitter users communicate with 
the public and their followers through posts called “Tweets.” (Id. at ¶ 25.) To 
create a Twitter account, prospective users are required to complete an online 
registration process. (Id. at ¶ 25.) The registration process involves the user’s 
acceptance of Twitter’s User Agreement, which includes its Terms of Service, 
rules, and policies. (Id. at ¶ 37.) Each user is required to assent to the User 
Agreement and acknowledge that by continuing use of Twitter’s services, the 
user agrees to be bound by the current version of its Terms of Service. (Id.) The 
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parties do not dispute that the Plaintiffs accepted Twitter’s Terms of Service 
and rules by assenting to Twitter’s User Agreement and continued use of 
Twitter’s services. 
 Since at least September 2009, the User Agreement has stated that “[a]ll 
disputes related to these Terms or Services will be brought solely in the federal 
or state courts located in San Francisco County, California, United States,” and 
that the parties “consent to personal jurisdiction and waive any objection as to 
inconvenient forum.” (2021 Twitter Terms of Service, ECF No. 41–2; 2009–2020 
Twitter Terms of Service, ECF No. 58–1.) The User Agreement exempts 
government officials or agencies using Twitter in their official capacities and 
who are legally unable to accept the forum selection clause. (Id.) By agreeing to 
the terms of the User Agreement, users also agree to abide by Twitter’s rules 
and policies. The rules regulate the content users may post on the platform 
and prohibit violent, inciteful, hateful content and prohibit the spreading of 
misinformation regarding Covid-19. (Id. at ¶ 37.); see also (Carome Decl., ECF 
Nos. 41–3, 41–4, 41–5.) Twitter may enforce these policies by blocking or 
removing specific Tweets that it determines to be in violation of the Rules, by 
temporarily or permanently suspending an account, or by a combination of 
these steps. (Carome Decl., ECF No. 41–5.) 
 Trump created his Twitter account in 2009 and used it for several years 
to engage with his followers about politics, celebrities, golf, and business 
interests. (Id. at ¶ 43.) Trump continued using his Twitter account even after 
he was sworn in as the Forty-Fifth President of the United States. (Id. at ¶ 44.) 
On January 7, 2021, Twitter permanently suspended then–President Trump’s 
account for purportedly violating its Rules prohibiting the incitement of 
violence related to the January 6 Capitol attack. (Id. at ¶ 113.) Twitter also 
suspended the accounts of other named Plaintiffs or caused their accounts to 
lose thousands of followers. (Id. at ¶¶ 122, 128, 129, 132, 142, 145, 150, 153.)  
 The Plaintiffs initiated this action on July 7, 2021 and filed the operative 
amended complaint on July 27, 2021. (Am. Coml., ECF No. 21.) The Plaintiffs 
allege the following claims: (1) violation of the First Amendment to the United 
States Constitution, (2) seeking a declaratory judgment that Section 230 of the 
Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230 is unconstitutional, and related 
injunctive relief; (3) a claim seeking injunctive relief under the Florida 
Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act (“FDUTPA”), Florida Statutes § 
501.203(8); and (4) a claim seeking damages under FDUTPA, Florida Statutes § 
501.2041. As part of their theory of liability, the Plaintiffs’ claim that Twitter, 
and its owner Defendant Jack Dorsey, succumbed to the coercion efforts of 
Democratic legislators and took actions to censor the Plaintiffs’ Twitter 
accounts based on their conservative beliefs. (Id. at ¶ 51.)  
Case 1:21-cv-22441-RNS   Document 87   Entered on FLSD Docket 10/26/2021   Page 2 of 13
 On September 1, 2021, Twitter filed the instant motion to transfer to the 
Northern District of California as required by the forum selection clause in 
Twitter’s Terms of Service contained in its User Agreement. (See generally, 
Mot., ECF No. 41.) 
2. Legal Standard 
 “[T]he appropriate way to enforce a forum selection clause pointing to a 
state or foreign forum is through the doctrine of forum non conveniens.” Atl. 
Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court for W. Dist. of Tex., 571 U.S. 49, 60 (2013). 
“28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) is merely a codification of the doctrine of forum non 
conveniens for the subset of cases in which the transferee forum is within the 
federal court system; in such cases, Congress has replaced the traditional 
remedy of outright dismissal with transfer.” Id. Generally, to obtain a transfer 
based on the doctrine of forum non conveniens, a movant must demonstrate 
that: “(1) an adequate alternative forum is available; (2) the public and private 
factors weigh in favor of a transfer; and (3) the plaintiff can reinstate his suit in 
the alternative forum without undue inconvenience or prejudice.” GDG 
Acquisitions, LLC v. Gov't of Belize, 749 F.3d 1024, 1028 (11th Cir. 2014).  
 However, this analysis changes dramatically if the agreement between 
the parties contains a valid forum selection clause. Atl. Marine, 571 U.S. at 63. 
Indeed, the existence of a forum selection clause is essentially dispositive in the 
28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) or forum non conveniens analysis. Id. at 62; see also GDG 
Acquisitions, 749 F.3d at 1028 (“an enforceable forum selection clause carries 
near-determinative weight” in the forum non conveniens analysis). “When the 
parties have agreed to a valid forum selection clause, a district court should 
ordinarily transfer the case to the forum specified in that clause. Only under 
extraordinary circumstances unrelated to the convenience of the parties should 
a § 1404(a) motion be denied.” Atl. Marine Constr. Co., 571 U.S. at 62. 
 In analyzing the application of a forum selection clause, a court must 
determine whether: (1) the clause is valid; (2) the clause is mandatory or 
permissive; and (3) the claim at issue falls within the scope of the clause. 
See Bahamas Sales Assoc., LLC v. Byers, 701 F.3d 1335, 1340 (11th Cir. 2012) 
(“To determine if a claim falls within the scope of a clause, we look to the 
language of the clause.”); Fla. Polk Cty. v. Prison Health Servs. Inc., 170 F.3d 
1081, 1083 (11th Cir. 1999) (courts must further determine whether clause is 
mandatory or permissive).  
 Once established, the existence of a valid forum selection clause 
governing the claims at issue shifts the burden from the party seeking 
dismissal or transfer to the nonmovant to establish that dismissal is improper. 
See Atl. Marine., 571 U.S. at 63; Stiles v. Bankers Healthcare Grp., Inc., 637 F. 
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App’ x 556, 562 (11th Cir. 2016); Pappas v. Kerzner Int’l Bah. Ltd., 585 F. App’x 
962, 967 (11th Cir. 2014). The party seeking to avoid the forum selection 
clause bears a “heavy burden of proof” that the clause should be set 
aside. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 595 (1991). A court 
evaluating a motion to transfer should “afford no weight to either the plaintiff’s 
selected forum or the parties’ private interests, and [should] ignore the choice-
of-law rules of the original venue.” Hisey v. Qualtek USA, LLC, 753 F. App’x 
698, 703 (11th Cir. 2018) (citing Atl. Marine, 571 U.S. at 62–65).  
 Typically, a plaintiff may seek to overcome this burden by showing that 
the public interest favors the preselected forum. Id. “Public-interest factors may 
include ‘the administrative difficulties flowing from court congestion; the local 
interest in having localized controversies decided at home; [and] the interest in 
having the trial of a diversity case in a forum that is at home with the law.’” Id. 
(quoting Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 241 & n.6 (1981)). 
3. Analysis  
 Twitter has filed the subject motion to transfer this matter to the 
Northern District of California as required by the mandatory forum selection 
clause accepted by the Plaintiffs when they assented to the User Agreement. 
(See generally, Mot. ECF No. 41.) Twitter also argues that the Plaintiffs’ claims 
stem from Twitter’s application of its Terms of Service, rules, and policies, and 
thus, are within the broad scope of the forum selection clause. 
 The Plaintiffs do not dispute that they accepted the terms of the Twitter 
User Agreement. Yet, the Plaintiffs oppose the motion on the grounds that 
Trump was the sitting President at the time his account was suspended and 
thus, the forum selection clause by its very own terms excludes him from the 
forum requirement. (See generally, Resp. in Opp’n, ECF No. 58.) The Plaintiffs 
also argue that the clause is ambiguous and not mandatory, and that the 
public interest weighs in favor of denying transfer. 
 In reply, Twitter argues that Trump is not exempt from application of the 
forum selection clause because he has filed this action in his individual 
capacity, seeks reinstatement of his Twitter account for use in his personally 
capacity, and originally assented to Twitter’s User Agreement as an individual. 
(See generally, Reply, ECF No. 65.)  
 The Plaintiffs filed a surreply arguing that this Court should decline 
following the holding in Trump v. YouTube, LLC, No. 21-cv-22445-KMM, ECF 
No. 70 at 13 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 6, 2021) (Moore, J.). In that related case, the 
Honorable K. Michael Moore granted YouTube’s motion to transfer because the 
forum selection clause was valid and mandatory, and the plaintiffs, including 
Trump, failed to meet their heavy burden of showing the public interest favors 
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their preferred forum.  
 For the reasons stated below, the Court finds that the motion to transfer 
is due to be granted. (ECF No. 41.) First, Trump’s former status as the 
President of the United States does not preclude the application of the forum 
selection clause. Second, the forum selection clause is valid and mandatory. 
Third, the forum selection clause encompasses the Plaintiffs’ claims. And 
fourth, the Plaintiffs have failed to satisfy their heavy burden to show that this 
case should not be transferred.  
A. Trump is not exempted from the application of Twitter’s forum 
selection clause  
 The parties agree that from September 2009 through August 2021, 
Twitter’s User Agreement has contained a version of the following forum 
selection clause at issue in this case:  
 
6. General  
We may revise these Terms from time to time. The changes will not 
be retroactive, and the most current version of the Terms, which 
will always be at twitter.com/tos (https://twitter.com/en/tos), will 
govern our relationship with you. We will try to notify you of 
material revisions, for example via a service notification or an email 
to the email associated with your account. By continuity to access 
or use the Services after those revisions become effective, you agree 
to be bound by the revised Terms. 
 
The laws of the State of California, excluding its choice of law 
provisions, will govern these Terms and any dispute that arises 
between you and Twitter. All disputes related to these Terms or the 
Services will be brought solely in the federal or state courts located 
in San Francisco County, California, United States, and you 
consent to personal jurisdiction and waive any objection as to 
inconvenient forum. 
 
If you are a federal, state, or local government entity in the United 
States using the Services in your official capacity and legally 
unable to accept the controlling law, jurisdiction or venue clauses 
above, then those clauses do not apply to you. For such U.S. 
federal government entities, these Terms and any action related 
thereto will be governed by the laws of the United States of America 
(without reference to conflict of laws) and, in the absence of federal 
law and to the extent permitted under federal law, the laws of the 
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State of California (excluding choice of law).  
 
(2021 Twitter Terms of Service, ECF No. 41–2; 2009–2020 Twitter Terms of 
Service, ECF No. 58–1.) (emphasis added).   
 The Plaintiffs argue that Trump is exempted from the forum selection 
clause because he was the sitting President at the time his Twitter account was 
suspended and was legally unable to accept the forum selection clause.  
 Even assuming that Trump was using his account in his official capacity, 
Trump has not advanced any legal authority to support his contention that he 
satisfies the second requirement of the exemption: that he is “legally unable to 
accept the controlling law, jurisdiction, or venue clauses. . .” The response in 
opposition cites several regulations to show that Trump was legally prohibited 
from accepting the forum selection clause at issue. (Resp. in Opp’n, ECF No. 58 
at 9.) However, after a careful review of the citations, the Court finds that not 
one prevents Trump for accepting the forum selection clause.  
 The Plaintiffs cite to 44 U.S.C. § 2904, which outlines the general 
responsibilities for records management by the Archivist of the United States 
and by the Administrator of General Services. The Court does not find, nor do 
the Plaintiffs cite to, any section of the code that prevents a federal actor from 
accepting a forum selection clause.  
 Next, the Plaintiffs argue that 36 C.F.R. § 1220 prevents Trump from 
accepting Twitter’s forum selection clause. Notably, the Plaintiffs fail to point 
the Court to the specific language they rely on. Section 1220 “specifies policies 
for Federal agencies’ records management programs relating to proper records 
creation and maintenance, adequate documentation, and records disposition.” 
36 C.F.R. § 1220.1. Again, the Court is unable to find any authority prohibiting 
Trump from accepting Twitter’s forum selection clause.  
 The Plaintiffs also cite to 31 U.S.C. § 1341, which sets forth the 
limitations on expending for federal employees. Section 1341 prohibits federal 
employees from: “(B) involve[ing] either government in a contract or obligation 
for the payment of money before an appropriation is made unless authorized by 
law; . . [or] “ (D) involve[ing] either government in a contract or obligation for 
the payment of money required to be sequestered under section 252 of the 
Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985.” 31 U.S.C. § 
1341. The Plaintiffs have not shown that Twitter’s User Agreement constitutes 
a contractual obligation for the payment of money. After reviewing the different 
versions of the User Agreement’s Terms of Service, the Court finds that the 
contract between the parties is not one for the exchange of money. Lastly, the 
Plaintiffs cite to a regulation governing procurement contracts, which has no 
bearing to the contract at issue in this case. 41 C.F.R. § 1, et seq.  
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 Moreover, the Court finds that the Plaintiffs’ reliance on Knight First 
Amend. Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 928 F.3d 226, 230 (2d Cir. 2019), cert. 
granted, judgment vacated sub nom. Biden v. Knight First Amend. Inst. At 
Columbia Univ., 141 S. Ct. 1220, 209 L. Ed. 2d 519 (2021), is misplaced. There, 
the Second Circuit held that Trump’s Twitter account was a public forum, such 
that Trump violated the First Amendment by blocking other Twitter users from 
interacting with his account. Knight, 928 F.3d at 237–38. Knight has no 
bearing on the proceedings at hand because it did not consider the 
enforceability of Twitter’s forum selection clause, particularly, whether Trump 
was exempted from its requirements in his capacity as President.  
 For these reasons, the Court finds that Trump’s status as President of 
the United States does not exclude him from the requirements of the forum 
selection clause in Twitter’s Terms of Service.  
B. Twitter’s forum selection clause is mandatory and enforceable  
 Twitter argues that the forum selection clause in its Terms of Services is 
mandatory and enforceable under the circumstances because “other courts to 
consider the question have found Twitter’s forum selection clause to be 
mandatory.” (Mot., ECF No. 41 at 14.) Twitter cites to several cases in which 
other federal courts have enforced Twitter’s forum selection clause. See Brittain 
v. Twitter Inc., No. CV-18-01714-PHX-DGC, 2019 WL 110967, at *2 (D. Ariz. 
Jan. 4, 2019); see also Wingo v. Twitter, Inc., No. 14-2643, 2014 WL 7013826, 
at *3 (W.D. Tenn. Dec. 12, 2014); Doshier v. Twitter, Inc., 417 F. Supp. 3d 
1171, 1180 (E.D. Ark. 2019). Additionally, Twitter contends that the forum 
selection clause, by its own terms, is mandatory. (Mot., ECF No. 15–17.) 
 On the other hand, the Plaintiffs contend that Twitter’s forum selection 
clause is ambiguously worded, and that any ambiguity should be interpreted 
against the drafter. (Resp. in Opp’n, ECF No. 58 at 7–8.) The Plaintiffs argue 
that “Defendant’s forum selection clause contains terminology that suggests it 
could be either mandatory or permissive. Specifically, while it references 
exclusivity in that “all disputes . . . will be brought solely” in California, it then 
proceeds to state that parties to this clause “consent to personal jurisdiction 
and waive any objection” to actions brought in California.” (Id. at 8.) Moreover, 
the Plaintiffs aver that an ambiguity exists as a result of the use of “consent” 
because it implies that the clause is not mandatory. (Id.) The Plaintiffs further 
argue that the forum selection clause at issue is permissive, rather than 
mandatory and thus, does not command the forum for this litigation. (Id. at 9–
10.) The Plaintiffs aver that this case is analogous to Travelcross, S.A. v. 
Learjet, Inc., No. 10-61842-CIV, 2011 WL 13214118, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 28, 
2011), where the court found that a forum selection clause was ambiguous.  
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 In reply, Twitter argues that “[t]he provision on which Plaintiffs rely does 
not even address the forum in which a user may sue Twitter; it instead speaks 
to defenses that a user waives in a suit filed by Twitter against him.” (Reply, 
ECF No. 65 at 6.) “There is nothing ‘contradictory,’ about one provision 
mandating an exclusive forum and a second provision waiving defenses against 
being sued in that forum.” (Id.) Lastly, Twitter distinguishes Travelcross 
because that case was “based specifically on the fact that the clause at issue 
there did not include the type of mandatory and exclusive limitations on where 
suits will be brought, that Twitter’s clause does include.” (Id.)  
 After considering the parties’ arguments and reviewing the relevant legal 
authorities, the Court finds that Twitter’s forum selection clause is mandatory, 
not permissive. Indeed, the clause states “All disputes related to these Terms or 
the Services will be brought solely in the federal or state courts located in San 
Francisco County, California, United States.” (2021 Twitter Terms of Service, 
ECF No. 41–2; 2009–2020 Twitter Terms of Service, ECF No. 58–1.) The use of 
“all” and “solely” clearly demonstrate the forum selection clause is mandatory. 
Landau v. Jaffa, No. 18-60772-CIV, 2018 WL 4778426, at *3 (S.D. Fla. July 19, 
2018) (Seltzer, J.) (determining forum selection clause was enforceable and 
mandatory because it required that the parties “resolve all disputes within the 
sole jurisdiction of the courts of the State of Utah.”) (emphasis added); Margolis 
v. Warner Chilcott (US), LLC, No. 16-23891-CIV, 2017 WL 9324774, at *3 (S.D. 
Fla. June 14, 2017) (Torres, MJ.) (finding forum selection clause was 
enforceable and mandatory because it stated, “Employer and Employee consent 
to the sole jurisdiction of the federal and state courts of New Jersey.”) 
(emphasis added). Additionally, the use of the word “consent” is not dispositive 
considering the mandatory language employed. Margolis, 2017 WL 9324774, at 
*3. 
 Moreover, the Court finds that the Plaintiffs’ reliance on Travelcross is 
misplaced. There, the forum selection clause stated, “the courts of Kansas shall 
have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine all claims, disputes, actions 
or suits which may arise hereunder.” Travelcross, 2011 WL 13214118, at *2. 
The court explained that “jurisdiction is not the same as venue,” and found 
that the “‘exclusive jurisdiction’ language does not mandate venue in Kansas.” 
(Id.) Next, the court found that the next sentence— “Travelcross expressly 
consents to jurisdiction and venue in the state and federal courts of Kansas for 
any claims or disputes arising hereunder”—is not apparently mandatory. Id. 
The court reasoned that the sentence did not includes words like “shall,” or 
“only.” Id. Here, Twitter has used words like “solely” and included “all 
disputes.” See YouTube, No. 21-cv-22445-KMM, ECF No. 70 at 13 (finding 
forum selection clause was mandatory and enforceable and distinguishing 
Case 1:21-cv-22441-RNS   Document 87   Entered on FLSD Docket 10/26/2021   Page 8 of 13
Travelcross because “[i]n this case there is no cause for uncertainty because 
the forum selection clause states that all claims “will be litigated exclusively” in 
California courts.”). In their surreply, the Plaintiffs attempt to distinguish 
YouTube by arguing that unlike the clause in that case, Twitter’s forum 
selection clause exempts federal government officials and because Trump’s 
account was suspended while he was President he is not bound by the clause. 
(Surreply, ECF No. 75 at 3–4.) This argument has already been rejected by the 
Court. 
 Lastly, the Court notes that the Plaintiffs do not attempt to distinguish 
the cases relied on by Twitter in which other federal courts found its forum 
selection clause mandatory and enforceable.  
C. Twitter’s forum selection clause encompasses the Plaintiffs’ claims 
 Twitter argues that the language of the forum selection clause includes 
the Plaintiffs’ claims because the clause requires that “all disputes related to 
[Twitter’s] Terms or the Services” to be litigated in California.” (Mot., ECF No. 
41 at 15.) This clause encompasses Plaintiffs’ claims because they relate to 
Plaintiffs’ use of the Twitter platform and to Twitter’s enforcement of its terms. 
(Id.)  
 In response, the Plaintiffs argue that the claims asserted in the amended 
complaint do not arise within the scope of the forum selection clause. (Resp., in 
Opp’n, ECF No. 58 at 10–12.) The Plaintiffs dispute that their claims are based 
on the access and use of Twitter’s services because Plaintiffs FDUPTA claims 
relate to Twitter’s deceptive practices towards all current and prospective users 
in Florida. (Id. at 11.) (citing Management Computer Controls, Inc. v. Charles 
Perry Constr., Inc., 743 So. 2d 627 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)). Additionally, the 
Plaintiffs argue that public policy weighs in favor of finding that the FDUPTA 
claims do not arise out of the agreement between the parties and that the 
forum selection clause does not apply. (Id. at 12.)   
 In reply, Twitter argues that its forum selection clause “is not so limited; 
as noted, it governs all disputes ‘related to’ either the ‘Terms’ or Twitter’s 
‘Services’—including its platform—in any way.” (Reply, ECF No. 65 at 11.) 
Additionally, the Plaintiffs’ Florida statutory claims “are inextricably linked to 
the [Twitter Terms]” and are therefore “covered by the … clause.” (Id.) (citing 
YouTube, No. 21-cv-22445-KMM, ECF No. 70 at 19. 
 The Court finds that the application of the forum selection clause in this 
litigation, including the Plaintiffs’ FDUPTA claims, does not contravene public 
policy. See Gordon v. Sandals Resorts Int’l, Ltd., 418 F. Supp. 3d 1132, 1139 
(S.D. Fla. 2019), appeal dismissed sub nom. Gordon v. Sandals Resorts Int’l, 
Ltd, No. 19-14869-GG, 2020 WL 3042742 (11th Cir. Apr. 1, 2020) (noting that 
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“Florida has a muddled public policy regarding whether a forum selection 
clause should be enforced against a plaintiff bringing a [FDUPTA] claim,” and 
“declin[ing] to find that the enforcement of the forum selection clause would 
contravene Florida public policy.”) (Scola, J.); see also McCoy v. Sandals 
Resorts Int’l, Ltd., No. 19-CV-22462, 2019 WL 6130444, at *10 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 
19, 2019) (Bloom, J.), appeal dismissed sub nom. Gordon v. Sandals Resorts 
Int’l, Ltd, No. 19-14869-GG, 2020 WL 3260707 (11th Cir. Apr. 1, 2020) 
(“Therefore, as in Gordon, the Court declines to find that enforcement of the 
forum selection clause at issue here would contravene Florida's public policy.); 
YouTube, No. 21-cv-22445-KMM, ECF No. 70 at 16. 
 Next, the Court must determine whether the FDUTPA claims in the 
amended complaint arise under the terms of the forum selection clause. For 
the reasons discussed below, the Court finds that the forum selection clause 
applies to the Plaintiffs’ FDUTPA claims.  
 Although the Plaintiffs argue that their claims do not arise under the 
forum selection clause and instead stem from the deceptive practices 
prohibited by FDUTPA, a review of the amended complaint leads the Court to a 
different conclusion. In counts three and four, the Plaintiffs bring claims for 
violations of FDUTPA. Each count challenges Twitter’s application of its 
policies, rules, standards, which serve to regulate User content. (Am. Compl., 
ECF No. 21 at ¶¶ 204, 205, 224, 225.) Indeed, at the heart of the Plaintiffs’ 
FDUTPA claims is that Twitter was deceptive in its “inconsistent application of 
their standards in banning the Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members.” (Id. 
at ¶ 212.) Accordingly, the Court rejects the Plaintiffs’ argument that their 
FDUTPA claims are independent from any agreement between the Plaintiffs and 
the Defendants. “To the contrary, the FDUTPA claims are inextricably linked to 
the aforementioned provisions of the [Terms of Service], based on the 
allegations included in the Amended Complaint.” YouTube, No. 21-cv-22445-
KMM, ECF No. 70 at 19. 
 In their surreply, the Plaintiffs argue that YouTube is inapplicable 
because the Court failed to consider the application of Florida’s Social Media 
Platforms Act (“SMPA”), which creates a private cause of action against Social 
Medial Platforms that fail to consistently apply their standards for content 
moderation.” (Surreply, ECF No. 75 at 1–2.) However, the complaint does not 
separate its FDUTPA claims from the conclusory allegations that the 
Defendants violated SMPA. (Am. Compl., ECF No. 21 at ¶ 232.) Nor do the 
Plaintiffs explain what remedies they are entitled to under the SMPA that are 
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different from FDUTPA or that would be unavailable in California.1  
 For these reasons, the Court finds that the broad language used in 
Twitter’s forum selection clause encompasses the Plaintiffs’ claims. See Loomer 
v. Facebook, Inc., No. 19-CV-80893, 2020 WL 2926357, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 13, 
2020) (Smith, J.) (recognizing that a forum selection clause that applies to “any 
claim, cause of action, or dispute you have against us that arises out of or 
relates to these Terms or the Facebook Products” is broad enough to 
encompass claims related to deactivation of Facebook accounts); see also 
YouTube, No. 21-cv-22445-KMM, ECF No. 70 at 19. 
D. Public interest does not compel that the Court retain jurisdiction  
 Having found that the parties’ agreement contains a valid forum selection 
clause, the burden now shifts to the Plaintiffs to show that transfer of this 
action is improper. McCoy, 2019 WL 6130444, at *4 (citing Stiles v. Bankers 
Healthcare Grp., Inc., 637 F. App’x 556, 562 (11th Cir. 2016)). The Plaintiffs 
bear a high burden in this regard. Atl. Marine, 571 U.S. at 64. The Court is 
limited to consider only public interest factors. McCoy, 2019 WL 6130444, at 
*4.  
 The Plaintiffs offer five public interest considerations that weigh against a 
transfer: (1) the FDUTPA claims constitute a localized controversy that will 
affect how the Defendants engage in business in Florida; (2) several Plaintiffs, 
including Trump, are residents of Florida; (3) the bargaining positions between 
Twitter and its users weighs against a transfer, (4) Justice Clarence Thomas’s 
concerns regarding Section 230 in an opinion on a petition denying a writ of 
certiorari; and (5) recent case law weighs against a transfer of this action. 
(Resp. in Opp’n, ECF No. 58 at 13–17.) 
 The Defendants argue that there is no rule against applying a forum 
selection clause to FDUTPA claims. (Reply, ECF No. 65 at 9.) Additionally, they 
contend that the Plaintiffs have failed to satisfy their high burden of showing 
that public interest factors overwhelmingly disfavor a transfer. (Id.) The Court 
agrees.   
 First, the Court has already found that the Plaintiffs’ FDUTPA claims do 
not create a public interest reason for keeping this case in the Southern 
District of Florida. Second, this case does not present a localized controversy 
that warrants keeping the case in this district. “To the contrary, this case 
involves issues that are national in scope.” YouTube, No. 21-cv-22445-KMM, 
 
1 The Court notes that in a footnote in their surreply, the Plaintiffs contend that “[t]here is no 
California statute remotely similar to the SMPA,” however, this does not amount to an 
explanation of what remedies they would be deprived of if the case were transferred to the 
Northern District of California.  
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ECF No. 70 at 21. Indeed, while Trump and some other Plaintiffs are located in 
Florida, others are located throughout the country. (Am. Compl., ECF No. 21 at 
¶¶ 18–24.) This putative class action is based on a nationwide class. (Id. at ¶ 
234.) Third, Twitter is headquartered in California. (Id. at ¶ 25.) Fourth, the 
Plaintiffs invoke the First Amendment of the United States constitute to 
invalidate a federal statute. And Fifth, the Plaintiffs’ remaining arguments 
related to the parties’ bargaining power, Justice Clarence’s concerns, and the 
addictive nature of social media do not constitute the types of public interest 
considerations that weigh against applying a forum selection clause. YouTube, 
No. 21-cv-22445-KMM, ECF No. 70 at 21 (citing Atl. Marine, 571 U.S. at 64 
(“Public-interest factors may include ‘the administrative difficulties flowing 
from court congestion; the local interest in having localized controversies 
decided at home; [and] the interest in having the trial of a diversity case in a 
forum that is at home with the law.”)). These arguments do not share a nexus 
with Florida and instead raise general national issues related to social media 
platforms. 
  Nor is the Court persuaded by the Plaintiffs’ reliance on Seaman v. Priv. 
Placement Cap. Notes II, LLC, No. 16-CV-00578-BAS-DHB, 2017 WL 1166336, 
at *1 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2017). That case stemmed from an enforcement action 
brought by the Securities and Exchange Commission, in which a receiver had 
been authorized to bring civil claims against the corporate defendants. The 
defendants moved to transfer the litigation to another district. The court denied 
the defendants’ request for a transfer, finding that the public interest weighed 
against the application of a forum selection clause. Seaman, 2017 WL 
1166336, at *7. The court explained that litigating in another forum would 
increase costs on a receiver that had been appointed, thereby decreasing the 
funds available to investors and creditors. Id. Additionally, many of the 
investors resided in the original district. Id. Moreover, the Court noted that the 
alleged fraud and resulting injuries had occurred in the original district. Id. 
Those circumstances are not present in this case. Here, almost half of the 
Plaintiffs reside outside of Florida and Twitter’s inconsistent application of its 
rules and policies occurs nationwide. Certainly, the Plaintiffs intend to bring a 
nationwide class. Accordingly, the Court finds that the Plaintiffs have failed to 
meet their stringent burden of “showing that public-interest factors 
overwhelmingly disfavor a transfer.” Atl. Marine,571 U.S. at 64. 
4. Conclusion  
 For the reasons discussed above, the Court grants Twitter’s motion to 
transfer to the Northern District of California (ECF No. 41). The Clerk is 
directed to take all actions to transfer the case to the Northern District of 
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California.  
 Done and ordered in chambers, at Miami, Florida, on October 26, 2021. 
 
 
       _______________________________ 
       Robert N. Scola, Jr. 
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